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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A-3-102(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT
ISSUE: As described in the Brief of Appellant Sean Kendall (“Kendall”) (“App.
Brief”), at 1, the issue in this appeal is as follows:
Do the discriminatory and excessively burdensome attorneys’ fee and costs
bond requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78B–3–104 (“the Bond Statute”) and
the discriminatory costs undertaking requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 63G7-601 (“the Undertaking Statute”) violate the equal protection, freedom to
petition, and due process guarantees of the Utah and United States
Constitutions, and the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution, both
facially and as applied to Appellant Sean Kendall (“Kendall”)?
This Supplemental Brief is being filed, pursuant to the Supplemental Briefing Order of the
Utah Supreme Court dated December 22, 2016, because “the posture before the Supreme
Court creates a material difference in the argument presented.” (Supplemental Briefing
Order, at 1.) Specifically relating to the issue presented is the question of whether Zamora
v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78 (Utah 1981), the case primarily relied upon by Appellees
(collectively “the City”) and the trial court, should be overruled because it baselessly
manufactured a means of avoiding the serious constitutional defects in the statute under
consideration and arrived at the wrong conclusion, after applying the incorrect standards
(or no standards at all), regarding the facial unconstitutionality of the bond statute there
under consideration. The Utah Supreme Court is in a position to overrule the poorly

1

reasoned, unprincipled decision in Zamora, which has generated tremendous injustice over
the years. The Utah Court of Appeals would not have had the capacity to overrule Zamora.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: “[T]he constitutionality of a statute is a question of
law to be reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court,” as noted in App.
Brief, at 1. Further, in cases asserting a violation of article I, section 11 (“the Open Courts
Clause”) of the Utah Constitution, a majority of the Utah Supreme Court has refused to
presume the constitutionality of a statute alleged to deprive a party of access to the courts
or to a remedy. As a majority of the Utah Supreme Court noted, “this court has consistently
rejected the presumption of constitutionality of statutes challenged under the remedies
clause of article I, section 11.” Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, ¶ 50, 67
P.3d 436 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (writing for a majority of the Court).1 See also Currier
v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1362–63 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (“because [the statute under
review] impacts . . . a civil remedy . . . protected under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah
Constitution, the usual presumption of validity does not control our review of this
statute”).2

Appellant’s Reply Brief, at 24, cites to ¶ 8 of Wood as indicating that the “Utah Supreme
Court rejected a blanket application of heightened scrutiny to every challenge under Article
I, section 11.” That was, regrettably, an erroneous reading of the authority of ¶ 8 of Wood.
As Chief Justice Durham’s dissent makes clear, the statement regarding the standard of
review in the lead opinion is a minority view, departing from the Utah Supreme Court’s
“carefully crafted and long relied-on analytic model in article I, section 11 cases.” Wood,
2002 UT 134, ¶ 43, 67 P.3d 436 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (writing for a majority of the
Court). As is made clear in Wood, the “majority view” is that there should be a “heightened
level of scrutiny” and a continued rejection of the “presumption of constitutionality” where
significant constitutional rights are claimed to have been abrogated by a statute. Id.
2
The trial court erroneously applied a presumption of constitutionality to the Bond and
Undertaking Statutes challenged by Kendall, as follows:
1

2

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE ON APPEAL: Kendall has identified in the Brief
of Appellant, at 2, the abundant record of Kendall’s preservation of the primary issue on
appeal. References to the specific issue relating to the continued viability and applicability
of Zamora, and the centrality of Zamora to the arguments of the City, as well as to the
decision of the trial court that the Bond and Undertaking Statutes (Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B–
3–104 and 63G–7–601, respectively) are constitutional, are found throughout the
proceedings below.3
ARGUMENT
I.

ZAMORA HAS CAUSED THE DEPRIVATION OF ACCESS,
AND EXCESSIVE DELAYS IN GAINING ACCESS, TO UTAH
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS.

Kendall has experienced tremendous delay, expense, and discriminatory treatment
in this matter (see App. Brief, at 33–34) as a result of the reliance on Zamora by the City
and the trial court. Counsel for the City argued before the trial court as follows:
This Court is required to find the bond and undertaking statutes
constitutional. . . . [T]he Utah Supreme Court has already held the bond
statute is constitutional.

Further, it is well settled that a statute “is presumed constitutional, and [that
a court will] resolve any reasonable doubt in favor of constitutionality.”
(Quoting Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 2005 UT 30, ¶ 11, 116 P.3d
295.)
R. 550. Tindley incorrectly applied the general standard of review, which had theretofore
consistently been rejected in cases involving Open Courts Clause challenges to statutes,
citing as authority only Utah Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 2001 UT 2, ¶ 9, 17 P.3d
1125, a case that did not involve an open courts challenge nor any claim under article I of
the Utah Constitution.
3
See, e.g., R. 194–201; 325–37; 342–43; 375; 442; 546; 550–51; 646–50; 652–54; 780–
84; 785–88.
3

R. 325 (citing Zamora and Snyder v. Cook, 688 P.2d 496 (Utah 1984)).
Until and unless Plaintiff satisfies “the substantial burden” of convincing the
Utah Supreme Court that its decisions in those cases were wrong, the
decisions in Zamora and Snyder are binding on this Court and the decisions
from other states are unavailing.
R. 322.
The trial court, failing to engage in any due process, equal protection, open courts,
or freedom-to-petition analysis, relied almost entirely (and blindly) on Zamora in ruling
that the Bond and Undertaking Statutes are constitutional, stating as follows:
In the instant, the Utah Supreme Court has already held the bond statute is
constitutional. Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80–82 (Utah 1981) (holding
prior bond statute with substantially the same language constitutional in the
ordinary and usual circumstances); Snyder v. Cook, 688 P.2d 496 (Utah
1984) (same). . . . Moreover, like the bond statute, the undertaking statute
contains the same language that the “sum be fixed by the court” that the Court
in Zamora found important and gave courts flexibility to determine whether
the statute would be unconstitutional as applied to a particular plaintiff.
R. 550–51.4
A bare citation to Zamora (or one of the cases that have blindly followed Zamora
in its destructive wake) seems to simply lull the courts—state and federal—into a
slumberous failure to analyze the glaring constitutional defects of the Bond and
Undertaking Statutes. See, e.g., Rippstein v. City of Provo, 929 F.2d 576, 577–578 (10th
Cir. 1991) (citing Snyder and Zamora, without any analysis, the court simply stated
“[s]ection 78–11–10 has been upheld as constitutional.”); Mglej v. Garfield Co., 2014 WL

Likewise, in Snyder, 688 P.2d at 498, this Court engaged in no constitutional analysis and
relied solely on Zamora. Because plaintiffs did not “contend that they are impecunious or
unable to furnish the bond,” the Court upheld the bond simply because “[i]n Zamora this
Court held that the statute requiring an undertaking was constitutional and served the public
interest.” Id.
4

4

2967605, Case No. 2:13-cv-713, *2 (D. Utah, July 1, 2015) (without any mention of a
constitutional issue, the court concluded, citing Rippstein, that plaintiff’s “failure to post
an undertaking and bond necessitates dismissal”); Webecke v. Salt Lake City, Case No.
2:13-cv-1132, at 2 (D. Utah, April 22, 2015) (without any reference to any constitutional
issue, and citing Rippstein, the court held that “[b]ecause Plaintiff failed to file the required
undertaking and bond at the time the Complaint was filed, Defendants Motion to Dismiss
. . . must be granted.”); Webb v. Scott, 2015 WL 1257513, Case No. 1:11-cv-128, at *14
(D. Utah Mar. 18, 2015), reconsideration denied, 2015 WL 2183124 (D. Utah May 8,
2015), aff’d. in part, rev’d in part, on other grounds, and remanded, 643 Fed.Appx. 711
(10th Cir. 2016) (without any mention of a constitutional issue, the court stated: “[g]iven
Plaintiff’s failure to cite any facts that he complied with Utah Code Ann. § . . . 78B–3–104,
he has failed to present a genuine issue of material fact on his state law claims.”).
The Bond and Undertaking Statutes—and the cases applying them in a manner at
odds with due process, equal protection, and the constitutional guarantees of access to the
courts and the right to petition—have had tremendously discriminatory, unjust, and courtaccess-chilling effects. Those effects are not found merely in Zamora’s repugnant legacy
of unreasoned case law, but also in the ongoing injustices and denials of access frequently
faced by victims, indigent and non-indigent alike,5 of wrongdoing by law enforcement
officers whose state law claims remain unvindicated because of the oppressive,

“It is immaterial that a defendant can afford to be deprived of his property, or that other
means are available to alleviate his situation. Denial of due process affects the rich as well
as the poor.” Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 504 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Cal. 1973) (in bank).
5

5

burdensome, and discriminatory Bond and Undertaking Statutes and because they give up
when they find justice so elusive, if not impossible, to obtain. See App. Brief, at 16–17.6
One class of tort victims faces a discriminatory and unjust reality: A victim seeking
justice under state law for an injury caused by a law enforcement officer learns that if he
or she is seeking to pursue a state law claim against a law enforcement officer, he or she
could be bankrupted if the case is lost—even though the case is meritorious—because of a
unique statute, applying only to claims against law enforcement officers, that allows an
award of attorneys’ fees and costs against a losing plaintiff.
Then, the victim learns that, unlike any other people who have suffered injuries at
the hands of people other than law enforcement officers, he or she must (1) before filing a
Complaint, obtain a determination by a judge (with no legal procedure as to how that is to
be done) regarding the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs that will be incurred in the future
by a law enforcement officer sued by the victim and (2) post a bond, before filing a
Complaint, in the amount “found” by the court to be the fees and costs that will be incurred
in the future by the law enforcement officer.
If the victim—having learned of the tremendously unfair, arbitrary, and
discriminatory treatment of those who seek justice for violations of state laws by law
enforcement officers—is not deterred from seeking access to the courts, it could be only
because (1) the victim has enough resources or is so certain of victory that he or she is not

The filing of a bond for future attorney’s fees and costs under § 78B–3–104 “is an absolute
bar in essence to any constitutional action for most people.” R. 744. “They finally just
shake their heads and say there is no justice and they just walk away.” R. 728.
6

6

concerned about a potential liability of hundreds of thousands of dollars for fees and costs
in the event the case is lost; (2) the victim has an audaciousness and implacable sense of
principle that betrays what most would consider economic rationality; or (3) the victim is
not dissuaded by the prospect of bankruptcy.
II.

ZAMORA WAS WRONGLY DECIDED AND SHOULD BE
OVERRULED.

The Court in Zamora observed that “[i]t is noteworthy that the statute under
consideration has previously been involved in cases before this Court under differing
circumstances and has not been declared unconstitutional.” A more candid assessment
would have been to say that the statute under consideration had never been declared
constitutional—or that there had never been a ruling either way. The cases cited by the
Court in Zamora, 635 P.2d. at 80 n.5, purportedly supporting its observation that the statute
“has not been declared unconstitutional,” were Kiesel v. Dist. Court, 96 Utah 156, 84 P.2d
782 (1938), and Wright v. Lee, 101 Utah 76, 118 P.2d 132 (1941), neither of which
addressed the constitutionality of the bond statute.7
Contrary to the mandatory terms of the statute, the Court in Zamora, in an
unprincipled effort to validate the facially unconstitutional statute, manufactured a
“flexibility” for the trial court to take account of “the plaintiff’s circumstances,” 635 P.2d

In Kiesel, the Court was concerned only with whether the statute permitted any “discretion
in the court to permit filing of the undertaking after the motion to dismiss the complaint.”
84 P.2d at 784. In Wright, the Court found the statute did not apply because there was no
evidence the defendant had been acting in the course of his duties. In fact, the Court
explicitly noted that “[t]he constitutionality of the statute cannot be passed on . . .” 118
P.2d at 135.
7

7

at 8. It went so far as to twist the words “in an amount fixed by the court” as meaning the
trial court could arbitrarily ignore the requirement that the bond be “for the payment to the
defendant of all costs and expenses that may be awarded against such plaintiff, including a
reasonable attorney’s fee to be fixed by the court . . .”
Nowhere in Zamora is there any consideration of the court-access deprivations and
other impacts of the bond requirement on plaintiffs (or prospective plaintiffs) who are not
impecunious, nor is there any consideration of the fact that any bond requirement in a
meritorious case is an unconstitutional taking under the Due Process Clauses of the United
States and Utah Constitutions. Also, Zamora lacks any equal protection analysis. It simply
mentions that “the statute should be so applied as to . . . afford[ ] all persons equal justice
under law, and of access to the courts to serve that purpose . . .”8
A. LIKE THE CURRENT BOND AND UNDERTAKING STATUTES,
THE STATUTE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN ZAMORA
VIOLATED THE OPEN COURTS AND PETITION CLAUSES.
The very language of the Open Courts Clause establishes the constitutional
invalidity of the bond statute under consideration in Zamora and the current Bond and
Undertaking Statutes. Segmentation of the Open Courts Clause and emphases are helpful
in understanding the breadth of its protections:

8

The discriminatory classifications within the categories of (1) tortfeasors and (2) those
who seek recovery from tortfeasors and the lack of any fair or reasonable justification for
those classifications, particularly when access to the courts is at issue, are clearly violative
of federal and Utah equal protection guarantees. “When persons are similarly situated, it is
unconstitutional to single out one person or group of persons from among a larger class on
the basis of a tenuous justification that has little or no merit.” Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d
661, 671 (Utah 1984). See also Brief of Appellant, at 13–29.
8

(1) All courts shall be (2) open, and (3) every person, for an injury done to
him in his person, property or reputation, (4) shall have remedy (5) by due
course of law, (6) which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; (7) and no person (8) shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or
counsel, (9) any civil cause to which he is a party.
Other than chaining the courthouse door, few things could create greater burdens,
discouragements, and obstacles to seeking civil justice than to enact and enforce a
discriminatory law that requires those, and only those, who seek accountability from law
enforcement officers for injuries caused by their violations of rights purportedly protected
under state law to post a bond (for which a plaintiff would have to pay a premium and
provide collateral, R. 527, ¶¶ 38–43; 714) in an amount determined by a court, according
to some unknown and unspecified procedure9 and according to pure speculation by a judge,
who is not capable of reasonably estimating future costs and fees that will be incurred by
a defendant in a case that has not yet even been filed. R. 738–39 (“It would be very
speculative. . . . There’s no procedure. . . . There’s no standard . . . .”)
There is nothing fair about the bond and undertaking statutes, either during the time
of Zamora or now. And there is certainly nothing equal about the application of those

9

An experienced civil rights lawyer testified as follows:
Q: And how does one get into a court for a court’s determination before you
even file the complaint?
A: I don’t know how that would be done except maybe the way you’re doing
it right now.
Q: Nine months later since we filed -A: Yeah, nine months later.
Q: -- the complaint.
R. 739.
9

statutes, which create, for one class of potential plaintiffs, such enormous burdens,
uncertainties, and obstacles to obtaining access to justice through Utah courts. Yet, “[t]he
clear language of [article I, section 11] guarantees access to the courts and a judicial
procedure that is based on fairness and equality.” Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added).10
The requirement of a bond might be possible for some people to meet, but the realworld obstruction to access to the courts created by the requirement is what must be taken
into account in determining whether the courts are truly “open” to “every person” to obtain
a remedy “by due course of law” for an injury done to him or her. As this Court has noted,
the Open Courts Clause “imposes a substantive limitation on the legislature’s ability to
eliminate or unduly restrict causes of action seeking relief for injury to ‘person, property,
or reputation.’” Day v. Utah, 1999 UT 46, ¶ 37, 980 P.2d 1171 (emphasis added).11 A
requirement that a prospective plaintiff obtain—through some unspecified procedure and
without any standards—a judge’s determination as to the amount of attorneys’ fees and
costs that will be incurred in the future by a defendant in an action not yet even filed, then
post a bond (with collateral) in that amount (which in this case could have been between
$30,000 and $750,000 or more, R. 266; 270), is not only an undue restriction on a person’s

As noted in Brief of Appellant, at 29–30, “the right of access to the courts is an aspect
of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances,”
requiring strict scrutiny of any restriction. Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461
U.S. 731, 741 (1983).
11
In Psychiatric Assocs. v. Siegel, 610 So.2d 419, 423–24 (Fla. 1992), the Florida Supreme
Court recognized that bond statutes “create an impermissible restriction on access to the
courts.” (Emphasis added.)
10

10

access to the courts for justice; it is a definitive roadblock for almost everyone who seeks
to hold a law enforcement officer accountable for violations of state law.
There being no evidence presented by the City or by the State of Utah12 supporting
any purported rationale for the Bond or Undertaking Statutes, they cannot be permitted to
block access to the courts for remedies for injuries caused by law enforcement officers in
violation of state law.
The test to be applied to the abrogation or restriction on access to the courts under
Utah’s Open Courts Clause is as follows:
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured person an effective
and reasonable alternative remedy “by due course of law” for vindication of
his constitutional interest. The benefit provided by the substitute must be
substantially equal in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated in
providing essentially comparable substantive protection to one’s person,
property, or reputation. . . .
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation
of the remedy or cause of action may be justified only if there is a clear social
or economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal
remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective.
Berry, 717 P.2d at 680 (citations omitted).
Utilizing a similar test,13 the Florida Supreme Court held that a fees and costs bond

12

The State of Utah participated in the proceedings before the trial court (see, e.g., R. 650–
52) and filed a Brief in this appeal (limited to advocating the constitutionality of the
Undertaking Statute).
13
Siegel, 610 So.2d at 423–24. The second part of the test applied in Siegel is stricter than
this Court’s present test. In Siegel the court described the second part of the test as requiring
“a showing of an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of the right, and finds
that there is no alternative method of meeting such public necessity.” Id. at 424. In light of
the importance of protecting access to the courts, without discriminatory, undue
restrictions, Kendall urges the adoption of that test by this Court.
11

requirement imposed on anyone who sues medical review board participants does not
provide a plaintiff with an alternative remedy. Siegel, 610 So.2d at 424–25.
Similarly, in Utah there is no “alternative remedy” for plaintiffs seeking access to
courts, without unreasonable, discriminatory, and often prohibitive restrictions, for
remedies against law enforcement officers who have injured them as a result of the
violation of state laws. Also, applying the second part of the test adopted by this Court in
Open Courts Clause challenges, there has been no showing whatsoever of “a clear social
or economic evil to be eliminated,” or, even if there were such an established evil, that the
restrictions to access—which will often result in the complete elimination of a remedy—
are not an arbitrary or unreasonable means of achieving the objective.
A bond requirement may deter some frivolous cases, but it also deters meritorious
cases. It also allows those who are willing and able to provide a bond to pursue frivolous
cases. Such under- and over-breadth of a statute’s operation is not reasonable, fair, or equal.
B. LIKE THE CURRENT BOND AND UNDERTAKING STATUTES, THE
STATUTE CONSIDERED IN ZAMORA VIOLATED DUE PROCESS.
1. THE BOND STATUTE AT ISSUE IN ZAMORA AND THE BOND
AND UNDERTAKING STATUTES AT ISSUE HERE VIOLATE
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
This Court has explained the meaning and reach of procedural due process:
The Fourteenth Amendment states that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. Procedural due process
claims are evaluated under a two-part test. The first question is “whether the
[complaining party] has been deprived of a protected interest” in property or
liberty. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59, 119 S.Ct. 977,
143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999). If the court finds deprivation of a protected interest,
we consider whether the procedures at issue comply with due process. Id.
12

Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restor. Network, 2012 UT 84, ¶ 48, 299 P.3d 990.
The requirement of a bond and an undertaking constitutes the deprivation of a
property interest14 without due process of law. So too does a requirement that a certain
category of people seeking to pursue a cause of action for damages must—without any
procedure for getting before or designating a judge—go through some unspecified process
so a judge may determine if a bond and an undertaking might be waived or to engage in
gross conjecture and speculation about the amount of a bond or undertaking. The
deprivation is made even more egregious by the fact that the purported justification for the
bizarre, discriminatory Bond and Undertaking Statutes is to deter frivolous lawsuits, yet a
prospective plaintiff is not provided a hearing for a determination as to whether his or her
claim falls within the class of cases (i.e., frivolous cases) against which the bond and
undertaking requirements are supposedly aimed. That, in itself, is a taking in violation of
due process. Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 713, 720 (Cal. 1975) (in bank).
In Zamora, the Court recognized that the suggested purpose of the bond statute was
to protect “against frivolous and/or vexatious lawsuits,” 635 P.2d at 81,15 yet it failed to
require a due process hearing during which a court would determine whether the

“[A] vested right of action is a property righty protected by the due process clause.”
Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1987). Also, any amount required to be paid to
pursue a cause of action is a “taking” within the meaning of the United States and Utah
Due Process constitutional clauses.
15
The Court in Zamora recognized the discriminatory nature of the bond statute, when it
noted that “the danger of filing meritless actions also exists as to other kinds of lawsuits,”
635 P.2d at 81, yet it upheld the statute as facially constitutional without engaging in any
equal protection analysis.
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prospective lawsuit was “frivolous and/or vexatious.” Procedural due process was not even
considered in Zamora—just as it was not considered in any of the cases upon which Zamora
relied, see supra at 7, or in any of the cases relying on Zamora for the dismissal of
complaints because of a failure to file a bond. See supra at 4–5.
2. THE BOND STATUTE AT ISSUE IN ZAMORA AND THE
BOND AND UNDERTAKING STATUTES AT ISSUE HERE
VIOLATE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.
Both the due process clause of article I, section 7 and the open courts
provision of article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that
litigants will have [their] day in court.
Miller v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, ¶ 38, 44 P.3d 663. There must be “access”
and a “judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equality.” Berry, 717 P.2d at 675.
In assessing claims of due process violations, a heightened scrutiny applies when
there is an accompanying open courts clause challenge.16
[A]rticle I of the Utah Constitution, known as the “Declaration of Rights,”
contains affirmative guarantees of specific individual rights that are indeed
fundamental. . . . [M]ost, if not all, of these rights have generated some form
of heightened judicial scrutiny. . . . [T]his court has consistently applied
various forms of heightened review when article I rights are at issue.
*
*
*
This court has wisely avoided the “analytical straitjacket” of federal equal
protection analysis by avoiding a rigid test that dictates that some rights are
fundamental and others are not. Instead, regarding article I, section 11 rights,
this court should examine in an individualized inquiry whether a legislative

The Brief of Appellant, at 32, restated the general rule that “Utah courts apply a rational
basis standard of review to claims alleging due process violations.” The discussion
following that statement focuses on the failure of the Bond and Undertaking Statutes to
meet that test. However, rational basis is not the standard of review to be applied in cases
involving open courts challenges. As is made clear in the Reply Brief of Appellant, at 16–
19, heightened scrutiny applies to the due process claims in this case because the Bond and
Undertaking Statutes unreasonably burden the right of access to the courts.
16
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enactment denies a litigant “a remedy by due course of law” in order to
determine whether article I, section 11 applies to the case at hand.
Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134 ¶¶ 43, 50, 67 P.3d 436 (Durham, C.J.,
dissenting) (writing for a majority of the Court) (citations omitted).17 The test under the
appropriate heightened standard of review is as follows:
A legislative determination to interfere with, limit, or abrogate the
availability of remedies for injuries to person, property, or reputation
requires an important state interest and a rational means of implementation.
The greater the intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interest, the
greater and more explicit the state's reasons must be. It is necessary for the
legislature, first, and this Court, second, to balance the weight of the
governmental interest at stake against the countervailing importance of the
individual rights being compromised.
Condemarin, 775 P. 2d at 358 (Durham, C.J.) (emphasis added).18
Zamora and the trial court in this matter failed to apply that heightened scrutiny to
the statutes at issue. They also failed to recognize that the requirement of any bond or
undertaking was a due process “taking.” Had they done so, they would have been
compelled to find a violation of the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights.
CONCLUSION
Zamora should be overruled and the statutes at issue declared unconstitutional.

See also Hipwell v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987, 988 n.4 (Utah 1993); Condemarin v. Univ.
Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 366 (Utah 1989); Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1362–63 (Utah
App. 1993) (“a majority of the Utah Supreme Court had agreed in the Condemarin
opinion that analyzing the constitutionality of a state statute under the open courts
provision implicated a heightened level of review.”).
18
Justice Zimmerman concurred with the section of Chief Justice Durham’s opinion
describing that rule, Condemarin, 775 P. 2d at 366 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) and, as
noted by Chief Justice Durham, “the operation and effect of the equal protection test
[Justice Stewart] describes is identical to the due process analysis” advocated by Chief
Justice Durham’s opinion. Condemarin, 775 P. 2d at 356 n.6.
17
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